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1. Introduction  
Keith Cowling (1936-2016) is widely seen as the father figure of British Industrial Economics and 
a key contributor to the then emerging field of Industrial Organisation (IO). He supervised a legion 
of PhDs including scholars such as Michael Waterson and the late Paul Geroski.  Keith was one 
of Europe’s foremost economists, an early President of the European Association for Research in 
Industrial Economics (EARIE), and the founding editor of this journal. He had also co-founded 
the European Network on Industrial Policy (EUNIP) 
Born in Scunthorpe in 1936, the son of a train driver, Keith was a triallist in his teens at Scunthorpe 
United Football Club. He studied Agricultural Sciences at Wye College, a branch of the University 
of London, where his interests moved to agricultural economics. After completing his doctorate at 
the University of Illinois on productivity in agriculture, Keith began his academic career in 1961 
as a Lecturer at the University of Manchester. There Keith met his future wife Barbara. In 1966, 
Keith moved to the new University of Warwick, where his interests shifted towards the then 
developing field of industrial economics. In 1970 he was appointed the Clarkson Chair in Industrial 
Economics in the newly formed economics department, at the age of 33. As Head (1975-1978), he 
was instrumental in the transforming Warwick to a world leading economics department 
(Waterson 2003).  
Keith became a pioneer and key figure in a number of areas in industrial economics, including 
mergers and acquisitions, advertising, the theoretical determination of Structure, Conduct 
Performance (SCP) relationships and the welfare losses of monopoly power.  He was informed 
and motivated by real life challenges of real life people and aimed to find solutions that fostered 
social welfare by leveraging the power of theory and evidence. In mainstream IO he was mostly 
famed for his work on SCP and monopoly power. Building upon this contribution, Keith also 
became renowned for being critical of contemporary capitalism, arguing that its concentration 
tendencies rendered it prone to abuse of corporate power and paved the way to stagnation and 
crises.  In doing so, he provided an insight into how the micro (firm and industry) level-foundations 
of the industrial economy impacted upon macro-economic performance. He cross-fertilised 
mainstream and radical approaches to economics and was widely respected for his conceptual, 
mathematical and empirical rigour. Below, we highlight his major contributions in the fields of 
IO, international political economy and public policy.  
2. The Theoretical Specification of SCP 
Pre-IO industrial economics was mostly empirically-oriented. In the SCP paradigm, under profit 
maximising conduct by firms, the structure (notably degree of concentration) of the industry was 
seen as the key determinant of industry performance (profitability). A positive link was interpreted 
as implying a high degree of monopoly, inviting public anti-trust policies. Numerous studies had 
tested this relationship (see Scherer, 1970) with mixed results. The nearest to a conceptual 
framework at the time was the limit pricing model of Modigliani (1958) which under the ‘Sylos 
postulate’ (where incumbents and potential entrants share the same understanding of anticipated 
incumbent conduct), predicted prices are above competitive but below monopolistic levels 
depending on the strength of entry barriers. The work of Cowling and his then student Michael 
Waterson (C&W) were to change all that, providing the first mathematical specification of SCP 
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relationships. C&W (1976) started by assuming a profit maximising firm and showed that the 
industry price cost margin was related negatively to income elasticity of demand and positively to 
the degree of collusion and the Herfindahl index of concentration. While an identity, and not a 
causal link, the equation was interpreted as a mathematical derivation and confirmation of SCP. 
Subsequent work on contestable markets by Baumol (1982) and his associates (alongside the 
earlier limit pricing model) could then be seen as variations on the Cowling-Waterson ‘generalised 
oligopoly’ model (Pitelis, 1990). In this sense and perhaps ironically given his subsequent critical 
stance, Cowling became a co-founder also of the emerging field of IO with its emphasis on rational 
choice and mathematical rigour.  The choice of name of the newly founded IJIO was testament to 
that. The empirical part of Cowling and Waterson (1976) drew attention to that extant SCP 
empirical studies suffered from omitted variable bias, especially regarding the industry price 
elasticity of demand. The authors sought to adjust for this in a way that predated the subsequently 
routinely used first-differences approach.  In a later joint paper with his student Roger Sugden 
(1989), Keith expanded this relationship to include the role of transnational firms. Among others, 
the C&W model established the Herfindahl index as the theoretically relevant index of 
concentration. This influenced scholarly and policy work (Dansby and Willig, 1979, Farrell and 
Shapiro, 1990) and along with Stigler’s (1964) theory of oligopoly, served as an antecedent for the 
use of the Herfindahl in the landmark US Horizontal Merger guidelines first published in 1982 and 
revised many times since (Waterson, 2003).  
Building upon C&W, Keith went on to link excess capacity to the degree of collusion (Cowling 
1982), drawing on Steindl (1952) and Spence (1977). Following the last mentioned, it had become 
accepted that credible commitments in terms for example of investments in excess capacity could 
help incumbents maintain monopoly prices even in the presence of the threat of potential entry. 
Excess capacity could involve physical production, but also advertising, R&D and brand 
proliferation (Smiley, 1988). Cowling went further in positing that investments in excess capacity, 
could also incentivise incumbents facing potential entry to bolster the degree of collusion, leading 
to a positive link between the threat of entry and the degree of monopoly-an outcome that turned 
conventional wisdom on its head (Cowling, 1982, 1983) and a potent critique of contestability.  
Another landmark paper, reprinted four times, and described as one of ‘the two seminal articles 
on measuring economy wide losses from market power’ (Church and Ware, 2000, p.43) was 
Cowling and Mueller (1978). The authors argued that existing analyses underestimated the true 
size of monopoly welfare losses. They pointed out that in Harberger’s (1954) original article, the 
assumption of an industry price elasticity of demand equal to -1, would imply pricing at zero 
marginal costs. In the case of a linear demand and marginal revenue curves, monopolists would 
produce half of that of the competitive outcome and allocative inefficiency would become equal 
to half the observed value of monopoly profits. They also raised concerns with other assumptions 
and estimates and after having first corrected for these, and accounting for rent seeking and 
‘wasteful’ advertising expenditure, they estimated monopoly welfare losses of approximately 7 
and 13% of ‘Gross Corporate product’ for the UK and the USA- well above Harberger’s original 
estimates of between 0.1 and 1% of US GNP.   
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Advertising was a long term interest for Keith. In the mid 1970’s, he led a Warwick study exploring 
its relationship with concentration and profitability across a number of industries (Cowling et.al, 
1975). These included the automotive market, coffee and cigarettes which had wider implications 
for both competition and health policy (see also Cowling and Cubbin, 1971; McGuiness and 
Cowling, 1976). In the early 1980s - and in what he regarded as his favourite paper - he explored 
with John Brack, the impact of advertising intensity upon work-leisure choices. Standard 
neoclassical theory predicted that rises in real wages should lead workers to reduce their working 
hours in favour of greater leisure time, since the income effect (from higher real wages) dominates 
the substitution effect, and indeed this occurred during the nineteenth century. However, in the 
twentieth century this began to reverse, with total working hours in the USA increasing. Using US 
data, Brack and Cowling (1983) demonstrated how this reversal was related to advertising 
intensity. More recent evidence suggested that advertising continued to distort US work-leisure 
choices (Cowling, 2006; Cowling et.al, 2011).  
3. Monopoly Capitalism, International Political Economy and the Theory of the Firm 
The aforementioned contributions provided the foundations for what Keith regarded as his most 
important contribution, his book Monopoly Capitalism (1982). In line with Baran and Sweezy 
(1966) and drawing on the earlier work of Kalecki (1971), he was concerned that in the absence 
of rigorous anti-trust policy, monopolisation would lead to abuse of corporate power and 
eventually to stagnation.  His basic premise was a rise in industrial concentration impacted upon 
prices, distribution and demand-a link first drawn in a European Economic Review article 
(Cowling, 1976). That involved a direct aggregation from the C&W identity where the left hand 
side scaled up to the economy-wide share of profits. A rise in the economy-wide degree of 
monopoly would lead to a decline in the relative income share of labour and help precipitate 
stagnation, bolstered further by a decline in saving resulting from increased control of corporate 
retentions and pension fund surpluses (Pitelis, 1987). Moreover, firms would experience an 
increase in unplanned excess capacity which, in addition to serving as entry deterrent, could though 
the threat of retaliation help sustain the degree of monopoly and collusion during a slump 
(Cowling, 1983, Branston et.al 2014).  
 
In Cowling and Sugden (1987, 1994), this approach was extended to the global economy, where 
the activities of transnational corporations were seen as exacerbating stagnationist tendencies, also 
because of their mobility and (concomitant) power over labour (‘divide and rule’) and 
governments, that helped increase the aggregate profit share. The consequence was de-
industrialisation, deficient demand and the undermining of local development initiatives (see also, 
Cowling and Tomlinson, 2005).  
 
The focus on transnational firms, also led to a critical reappraisal of the theory of the firm. 
Following Coase (1937) and Williamson (1975), firms were seen as internal hierarchies which co-
ordinate production to economise on transaction costs, with their boundaries determined at the 
point where a further internal transaction would cease to reduce market transaction costs, at which 
point market exchange was as efficient.  Drawing on an earlier paper by Pitelis and Sudgen (1986), 
Cowling and Sugden (1998) regarded the boundaries of a firm as being determined by the locus 
and reach of their strategic decision-making. They defined the firm as ‘the means of co-ordinating 
production from one centre of strategic decision-making’ (ibid, p.67). Unlike conventional 
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approaches, this definition would for example include activities by some subcontractors. Cowling 
and Sugden (1998a) also focused on challenges posed by the hierarchical nature of modern 
corporation, whereby strategic decisions are often taken in corporate boardrooms by elites with 
little regard to wider stakeholder and systemic interests.  The outcome would be one of ‘strategic 
failure’ from the perspective of the public interest (Branston et al, 2006). A case in point was the 
global off-shoring activities of Japanese transnationals during the 1990s, which precipitated and 
exacerbated the ‘hollowing out’ of Japanese industry (Cowling and Tomlinson, 2000, 2002).  
 
4. Industrial and Trade Policy  
 
Keith’s interest in anti-trust went back to his work on mergers and acquisitions (Cowling et al, 
1979) and his proposal for tighter regulation of mergers.  That led naturally to the issue of public 
policy, in particular industrial policy, later in its link to trade policy. In this regard, he argued that 
understanding economic governance processes was critical in achieving outcomes in the wider 
public interest, and given the deindustrialisation of the UK’s manufacturing base in the 1980s and 
1990s - exacerbated by the activities of transnational corporations - he became a strong advocate 
of anti-trust, industrial and regional policy and keen to explore alternative possibilities for 
industrial development. In Cowling and Sugden (1998b) the authors revisited the free versus 
strategic debate issue drawing on their earlier work. They stated that in the context of transnational 
firms, ‘free trade’ itself could be seen as a form of strategic trade.   
In UK national politics, he played a significant role in an informal ‘think tank’ set up by Bryan 
Gould and subsequently taken up by John Smith, then Labour Leader of the Opposition (Cowling 
et al, 1989, Cowling and Sugden, 1992). He was especially influenced by the work of Piore and 
Sabel (1984) who began to see the potential of so-called ‘non-hierarchical’ and more co-operative 
modes of production, specifically in regional clusters or industrial districts of independent small 
and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) such as in the Emilia Romagna region of Northern Italy. In 
Cowling and Sugden (1999), they advocated the nurturing and development of multinational webs 
of SMEs to facilitate (international) co-operation in production activities. Keith was interested in 
international experiences of industrial policy, and emphasised the importance of underpinning 
industrial strategy with more inclusive economic governance structures for it to effectively foster 
the public interest (Cowling and Tomlinson, 2011).  
5. Epilogue 
During his life, Keith sometimes expressed frustration that mainstream journals were becoming 
increasingly reluctant to hosting challenging ideas while his radical counterparts sometimes 
labelled his approach as ‘Neoclassical Marxism’. Over time, however his ideas and interests 
became the staple of modern discourse, mainstream and post-classical (Pitelis, 2016). In IO his 
early work continues to hold significant influence among scholars (e.g. Fabra, 2006). More widely, 
unfettered corporate power, sometimes through share buy backs and non-voting shares, and its link 
to political power (Zingales, 2017), income distribution and the wage share (Piketty, 2014), 
advertising and fake news helping to determine elections, stagnating economic performance 
(Gordon, 2015) and the latest economic crisis, are now the order of the day leading to the current 
disillusionment with capitalism which threatens democracy and global stability (Pitelis, 2017).  
Keith would not fail to see the irony that while some of his ideas were seen by some as rather 
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radical, they are now at the forefront of scholarly and policy discourse. Industrial strategy has 
become no less than the flagship policy of the current UK Conservative government (Bailey et.al. 
2015), strategic trade policies are at the heart of Donald Trump’s administration and the Brexit 
negotiations,  while the EU Commissioner for Competition Margrethe Vestagewith has acquired 
a near heroic establishment status, for her epic battles against  alleged power abuse and the related 
issue of  tax avoidance by  today’s big tech monopolists. 
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